The Collective Identity Project (CIP) is a youth-led inquiry into what holds (or fragments), Lebanese political identity. 

Its thesis is that political fragmentation begins upstream of politics: in the question of who a people understands itself to be, and whether shared cultural ground can carry shared political agendas. Most attempts to address Lebanon's crises treat identity as a fixed fact; whereas, CIP treats it as evolving infrastructure that has to be built deliberately if any progressive politics is to last. 

CIP does not aim to manufacture a singular unified identity, nor to weaponize history, geography, or majority demographics. Instead, it works in the space between sectarian, regional, and ideological identities, cultivating their differences while building the shared frames that allow a national conversation to exist beyond crisis cycles.

Between 2020 and 2022, Studio Madane's Youth Politicians Working Group convened a series of debates among youth representatives from progressive parties such as National Bloc, Beirut Madinati, LiHaqqi, Minteshreen, Sawti, the Student Union in Lebanon, and progressive student clubs from universities such as LAU, AUB, LIU, and LU. 

The question driving the room was direct: what does Lebanese identity mean now, and can it carry a shared political agenda? In 2023, the conversation crystallized into a research focus group, with data sourced from civil society organizations and independent anti-corruption authors, internalized through debates about culture, politics, and religion. CIP launched as a venture in May 2024.

The 2023–2024 research surfaced a pattern: Lebanese youth describe national identity in diverse, often contradictory ways, and that fragmentation correlates with political disengagement. Cultural connection rarely translates into political coherence, meaning shared values do not produce shared agendas.

• Disengagement is deep, but not by choice. Only 18.5% of respondents consider themselves well-informed about domestic politics; 25.9% have no information at all. Yet many express a strong desire to engage.

• Trust in institutions has collapsed. 86.5% of youth surveyed do not trust the state's institutions, a level of disillusionment that compounds disengagement. Sub-identities are outcompeting the national one.

• Youth often prioritize sectarian, regional, or ideological identities over a Lebanese one, and the regional sub-identities (for example, a 'southern Lebanese' identity) are intensifying as central neglect deepens.

• Cultural common ground exists. Respondents converged on three shared values: freedom, diversity, education, and on cultural creativity as a national strength.